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1. As per the title, this paper does not deal with the right of all human beings to 
benefit from the medical and scientific progress to enjoy a better and healthier life, 
preventing and erradicating illnesses that not long ago could be deadly or cause 
lifelong consecuences, such as limp, deafness, etc. Sometimes it is neccesary to 
fight for what seems obvious, but it is not the case here now. Universal vaccination 
is not a philosophical, but a political problem. On the contrary, this paper deals 
with those that reject the use of vaccines for them or for their children, appealing 
to an alleged right, even when this means a serious risk for their own health and, 
more important, to the health of others. More precisely, I will discuss the very 
concept of (constitutional) right that underlie their claim of consider this conduct 
part of a right (freedom of religión, the right to rare their children according to 
certain values, etc.).  
 (I have tried to conform to the transdisciplinary character of the meeting, 
thought I am affraid I could not avoid a theoretical bias in my paper). 
 But, let me start with a short story. Not an impressive, but a common one; a 
true story after all. In the city of Granada, on the slope of a hill and looking to the 
Alhambra, there is a tipical andalusian neiborghood, with narrow alleys and white 
houses. It is called El Albaicín. In the year 2010, an outbreak of measles was 
detected in El Albaicín. The main focus was located at the state school of the area 
where most of the children had not been vaccinated. Obviously, this circunstance 
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had favoured the spreading of the disease. Acording to Health Authorities, for the 
outbreak not to become a serious epidemic, the children liable to contract the 
illness shall be vaccinated. From the begining of this situation, Health Authorities 
requested the parents to vaccinate their children and to submit a certificate of 
vaccination in order to the readmission of the children at school.  
 A great number of parents did not answer the authorities request and a 
smaller group actively denied to vaccinate the children. Health Authorities ordered 
the compulsary vaccination with the authorisation of the Trial Court of Granada, 
that considered that this measure was in accordance with the law, justified by the 
epidemiological report and proportional as it does not implies a great or 
disproportionate sacrifice. 
 At least two parents appealed to the Higher Court arguing that the decission 
of the Health Authorities violated the right to education of the children andthe 
right of the parents to rear their youth accordingly to their moral or religious 
values, and in general, to their beliefs, therefore deciding, among others aspects of 
their lifes, about their children health protection and education.   
 I will focus on the later issue: the right of the parents to rare their children 
according to their beliefs, moral and empirical (Article II, Section 12 Philipine 
Constitution).  
 The Higher Court presented the problem as a conflict of rights, that is as if 
there were two legitimate legal claims in competition. In the one hand, there was a 
“right” of the State to force compulsary norms in order to ensure public health, and 
in the other hand there was a right of the parents to decide if their children should 
be protected that way. [It is –continues the Higher Court– a conflict between the 
Authorities that considered that every children should be vacinated in order to 
avoid the risk of epidemic and the parents that think that not getting vacinated is a 
better way to protect their children health.] The Court, not only found arguable 
this way of protecting children health, but also stablished the greater importance 
of the colective goods or rights protected by the action of the Health Authorities.  
 I will analize this argument and the conception of rights presupossed by the 
Court. But prior to go further, I would like to clarify two points of this argument. 
 First, I think more accurate to speak about State powers instead of rights. 
And indeed, many norms that confer powers to the public authorities, also impose 
a duty to protect or promote a certain state of affair. [Therefore they are 
constitutive (as the confer powers) and –simultaneously– regulative norms (as 
they state a comamand).] This is the case with public health: authorities have the 
power, and at the same time, the duty to take the necessary measures (by ruling 
certain conducts) to protect it.  
 But, we cannot prensent this problem as a conflict between a power of the 
state and the right of the parents. In my opinion, this is a misunderstanding of the 
systematic and teleological relation between the two kind of norms. Thus, 
constitutional rights function as limits of state powers. Therefore, when a public 
authority, in the exercise of a power violates a constitutional right, there is no 
conflict between norms, but, simply a right violation. The other way around, when 
a public authority exercise power within the constitution, there cannot be a 
conflict of norms neither.    
 Second, if we present this problem as a disagreement about the best way of 
protecting the health of the children, so there is no conflict of rights neither. This is 
an epistemic disagreement that shows a conflict of beliefs about the effects –good 
or bad   – of getting vacinated. This kind of conflicts can be solved by empirical and 
scientific evidence, that, as matter of fact, are (or can be most of the times) quite 
conclusive at this point. [Children vaccinated against measles from 12 mounths of 
age reached a degree of protection of 94% to 98%. This degree raise up to 99% if 
the children get two doses at 15 mounths and 3 years old. Only 10 % of the 
children present febrile episodes between the fifth and the twelfth day after 
vaccination. These symptoms seldom last for more than two days, slaightly 
affecting the normal activity of the child.]    
 [Of course, freedom of opinion, religión, etc. involve the right to have 
whatever beliefs and act accordingly, even if these beliefs are obivously false for 
everyone else. There is a right to be wrong; in other words: freedom does not 
involve a commitment with truth. However, this is so unless the practice of your 
ideas put in risk or cause harm to others (as it happens when some parents deny 
the vaccination of their children in a hazardous situation that could turn into an 
epidemic)].  
 With all that, most of the academics as also constitutional and international 
courts (particularly, the European Court of Human Rights) would agree with the 
Trial Court of Granada in presenting this issue as a conflict of constitutional rights 
or as a conflict between constitutional rights and a public interest. In what follows 
I will argue that this way of understanding legal problems rest on a unsound 
conception of constitucional rights.  
 
2. This conception is known as “The Global Model of Constitutional Rights” (Möller 
2012). This conception of rights rest on three main thesis: 
 First, a theory of constitucional norms. Acording to this, constitucional 
rights norms present a different logical structure to that of legal norms. The former 
are principles whereas the later are rules. Rules conect a certain action or state of 
affairs with certain legal consecuence, be it a position within a legal relation, be it a 
penalty, conmpensation, etc.; in other words, rules prescribe an action or state of 
affairs as an obligation, a prohibition or a permission. On the other hand, principles 
express ideal requirements that impose the obligation to optimise a certain 
(empirical) content (Alexy). In contrast to rules, that express a definitive command, 
principles, as optimization requirements express a prima facie requierement (but 
still not their definitive content). 
 The second thesis refers to the structure of the legal system. As objects of 
optimisation, a trend toward rights inflation cannot be avoid (is unavoidable). 
Thus, not only important issues, but all autonomy interest should be protected as a 
(constitutional) right, what also includes trivial and even immoral activities. The 
continuous expanding of rights scope is –to use an image– necesarily interrupted 
by the growing scope of other rights that equally expand from the oposite direction. 
That is, under this conception, constitutional rights tend to conflict or interfere 
between them or with a public interest.   
 [If we conect the rights inflation thesis and the so-called “radiation effect” 
(Alexy), according to which constitutional norms radiate into all areas of the legal 
system, it turns out that not only those legal cases regarding constitutional rights 
or public interest, but almost any legal problem, is set out as a conflict of norms. 
Given that almost any claim can be founded on a (inflated) constitutional right, 
every single legal conflict is to be conceived as a conflict of constitutional norms].  
 The ways of solving this conflicts is the content of the third thesis, as  
conflicts of principles are not to be solved by the clasical criteria (lex superior, lex 
posterior or lex specialis), but by means of a balancing guided by the principle of 
proportionality. Thus, the principle of proportionality plays an inmportant rol 
regarding constitutional rights as it provides a criteria for the resolucion of 
conflicts between rights or between a right and a public interest and, at the same 
time, it allows for the identification of rights definitive content. 
 And now, let’s go back to our story. The conceptual scheme of this 
conception of rights allows to defend a prima facie freedom of parents to decide 
about the administration of vaccines to their children even when the health of 
childern themselves or the health of others is put in risk. Any limitation of this 
right must be justified by the principle of proportionality. 
 
3. [This conception of rights shakes the foundations –so to speak– of the usual 
understanding of the rol of rights in legal and political discourse. As one of the 
champions of this conception puts it: “The challenge that  propotionality in general 
and balancing in particular present to traditional theories of rights is that they do 
not recognize any special normative force of rights, for example by regarding them 
as trumps or side constraints. Rather, rights operate on the same plane as 
(conflicting) policy considerations, and it is precisely for this reason that it is 
apropiate to balance them against conflicting public interests” (Möller 2014: 156)].  
 Such a conception of rights must face some criticism that make it 
questionable.  
 First, rights inflation means the pre-admision in the content of 
constitutional rights of whatever claim the right holder wants to. That includes 
trivial activities, activities that can cause harm to others or put them in risk, or 
even inmoral activities. Is there a prima facie right to inffect others? In my opinion, 
inclusiveness at this first stage suppose to downgrade the notion of “right” in the 
political as well as in the legal discourse.  
 Second, the distinction between prima facie and defintive content is 
problematic as it implies two important conceptual distinctions.  
 Firstly, it separates the definition of a right and its limitation. The 
identification of the initial content –definition– of the right do not consider any 
other rights or public interests, but only the autonomy interests of the holder; it 
has to do only with the lifeplans of the holder whereas the definitive content is the 
outcome of the confrontation of the right with other rights or public interests 
through the filter of the principle of proportionality. Thereby every ruling of the 
exersice of the right, not to say a prohibition, is seen as an interference or external 
limit of the right. 
 I think this way of understanding rights ignores the relational nature of 
rights and liberties. The ruling of the exercise of a right or the diminishing of its 
scope in the interest of everyone cannot be seen as an external limit, but as the 
very delimitation of the right, that is, the specification of the conditions in which 
the holder can really exercise the right or ask for protection.    
 The second distinction originates from the former and refers to the 
assertion of a right and its normative consequences. The price to pay for a wide 
initial content of rights is its stringency. [As Möller says], within this conception, 
rights have no special normative force. To have a right does not mean that 
everything that is considered part of the right will be legally enforced.   
 This can lead to nonsensical conclusions, mainly regarding evil activities or 
those activities that can cause harm to others, since within the conceptual scheme 
of this conception, a certain conduct can be described as belonging to a right 
(prima facie), and at the same time, it can be described as an ilegal conduct 
(definitive) according to a certain legal norm that rules or limit justifiably the 
exercise of that right .         
 And moreover, if any ruling or limitation of prima facie constitutional rights 
(widely considered) is to be seen as an interference, thus, democratic legislation 
appears invariably as the antagonist of rights. Of course, there is a strain between 
constitutional rights and legislation, but this conception of rights disfigure their 
relation. In adition, every intervention of democratic legislator would be subjected 
to the principle of proportionality, reducing dramatically their legitimate capacity 
to decide about public issues.   
 Another line of criticism affects not the notion of right itself, but that of legal 
system. As we have seen, this conception of rights is a machine of generating 
conflicts between constitutional norms. [This conflicts of norms are to be solved 
later by means of the principle of proportionality.] Within this conception, every 
social conflict is translated into legal, or rather constitutional, language, but not 
solved by legal norms. It is only in a later stage, when both norms are compared 
that the judge decides which norm defeats the other, which one is to be applied. 
But the question is, are not normative systems, and particularly legal systems, 
supose to provide a solution to social conflicts? In this sense, logical coherence is 
not only a structural formal property (Alchourrón / Bulygin 2002: 101), but also a 
pragmatic requierement of any effective normative system. Of course, there are 
moral dilemas and legal hard cases; we cannot avoid them when dealing with 
norms, but they are to be decided –and actually are– through interpretetion and 
specification, not necessarily as norms conflicts. 
 And finally, if the principle of proportionality has the last word, we should 
not waste our time trying to elucidate the content of rights as we know them (that 
is, freedom of speech, right not to be tortured, etc.) based on the wording of the 
legal texts, or historical reconstructions of legal concepts, nor the will of 
constitutional legislators or their reasons to rule things the way they did it. The 
final consequence of this conception is to ignore the constitutional guarantees and 
even rights because they all are reduced to one: the right not to be treated 
disproportionately. 
   
4. My argument is that another conception of rights is posible. One that conceives 
rights as the result of an interpretative activity, and not the starting point for 
balancing. Of course, utility arguments –that are on the basis of propotionality– can 
be used in interpretation, but not only. And most of all, taking rights seriously, to 
use Dworkin’s famous words, exclude in many cases this kind of arguments. 
Anyway, setting the content of rights cannot ignore the rights of others and public 
interests; these are not reasons to a subsequent limitation, but circunstances that 
determine the true content of constitutional rights. 
 Once all legally relevant arguments have been considered and the scope of 
rights has been specified, –but only then– have rights an absolute normative force 
and therefore operate in practical reasoning as second order reasons, that is, 
excluding any other reason.       
